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THE CONSTRUCTION OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
Robert K. C. Forman 
Capitalizing on the constructivist approach developed by philosophers and psychologists, 
Steven Katz argues that mystical experience is in part constructed, shaped and colored 
by the concepts and beliefs which the mystic brings to it. Merits and problems of this 
constructivist account of mysticism are discussed. The approach is seen to be ill-suited 
to explain the novelties and surprises for which mysticism is renowned. A new model is 
suggested: that mysticism is produced by a process similar to forgetting. Two forms of 
forgetting are described: a massive and complete forgetting of concepts in the "pure 
consciousness event" and de automatization in the more permanent unitive experiences. 
I. Mysticism as a Result of Construction 
In this article I would like to address the issue which to me stands at the nub of 
the debate about the philosophical nature of mysticism: should mysticism be 
thought of as "constructed" somewhat like ordinary experiences or should it be 
seen as the result of another kind of process?' The notion that ordinary experiences 
are "shaped" or "constructed" by our conceptual system has become what is 
arguably the reigning metaphor in the humanities today. It was perhaps inevitable 
that scholars would one day apply this metaphor to mysticism. 2 One of the most 
renowned exponents of this view has been Steven Katz in his two books, and 
especially in his article, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism," who argues 
outspokenly that mystical experience is the result of such a shaping process, or 
as he says at one point, "the mind is active in constructing 'X as experienced. "'3 
In this article I will question the applicability of this constructivist metaphor to 
mystical experience and suggest a new model for it. Two prefatory remarks: 
First, following Ninian Smart, I propose limiting the discussion to those mystical 
experiences which are "certain interior experiences which are not described in 
terms of sense experience or mental images, etc."4 Mystics such as Shankara, 
Eckhart, and Zen adepts will thereby be the subjects under discussion, while 
visionaries, however interesting, will not. 5 The rationale is that this article is 
concerned with the etiology of the particulars of mystical experience. Since both 
the phenomenology and the physiological characteristics of these two forms of 
experience are markedly different, it seems plausible to assume that their respec-
tive etiologies also differ. 6 So as not to confuse what are apparently different 
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formative processes, I shall confine myself to these experiences for the nonce, 
leaving for another work a more complete account of the full range of mystical 
phenomena. Secondly, to the extent that we each share in the constructivist 
weltanschauung, the acceptance of the new model I propose may require the 
suspension of certain dearly-held epistemological presuppositions in order to go 
at mysticism afresh. 
What is this constructivist model? Katz himself introduces it in terms of 
perceptual psychology, and this is a good way to gain access to it. It looks 
something like this: an enormous array of sounds, light waves, magnetic waves, 
smells, chemical and electrical impulses within ourselves, etc. constantly bom-
bard us . We use our systems in such a way that we first sift, discard and simplify 
much of the incoming information to allow only a few of its possible dimensions 
into our awareness. Second, we further sort and organize the incoming informa-
tion into a very few dimensions and patterns, by means of which we impose a 
form on what we see and hear. The schema by means of which we construct 
and shape our thoughts and perceptions have been called "personal constructs," 
"categories" or "belief systems," "formularies," etc. One feature of this construc-
tive process which plays an important role in Katz's article has been described 
by the perceptual psychologist, Heinz Hartmann. He writes that when a behavioral 
or perceptual pattern is repeated often enough, it becomes automatized: 
In well-established achievements they [motor apparatuses] function 
automatically: the integration of the somatic systems involved in the 
action is automatized, and so is the integration of the individual mental 
acts involved in it. With increasing exercise of the action its intermediate 
steps disappear from consciousness . . . not only motor behavior but 
perception and thinking, too, show automatization ... 7 
A good example of an automatization is the unthinking way we drive a car. The 
automaticity of such complex processes may be viewed as an adaptation, an 
energy saving short-cut, which allows us to perform our average expectable 
range of tasks without reinventing the wheel at every step. That automatization 
is important for Katz's constructivist account of mysticism can be seen not only 
from his language," but in the only "non-controversial example" he provides in 
which one's schemata can be seen to be clearly constructing an experience. It 
concerns Manet's painting of Notre Dame: 
[B]eliefs shape experience, just as experience shapes belief. ... con-
sider Manet's paintings of Notre Dame. Manet 'knew' Notre Dame was 
a Gothic cathedral, and so 'saw' it as a Gothic cathedral as testified to 
by his paintings which present Notre Dame with Gothic archways. Yet 
close examination will reveal that certain of the archways of Notre 
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Dame which Manet painted as Gothic are in fact Romanesque. As 
Coleridge reminded us: 'the mind half-sees and half-creates'.9 
This example is excellent for from it we can easily see how Manet's experience 
was shaped by his perceptual automatizations. The visual information before 
him was of Romanesque (i.e., rounded) archways. Due to his expectation that 
he would see a Gothic (i.e., pointed) archway, he altered the visual information 
before him and instead saw pointed archways. He overlooked what was there 
and substituted for it something that was not there. \0 The psychologist E. H. 
Gombrich (to whom Katz refers in a gloss) specifies the kind of processes 
involved when concepts shape visual experiences. 
The individual visual information ... [is] entered, as it were, upon a 
pre-existing blank or formulary. And, as often happens with blanks, if 
they have no provisions for certain kinds of information we consider 
essential, it is just too bad for the information. \I 
This commonly studied process is one of replacing one segment of visual data 
with another due to perceptual habits or automatizations. 12 Imposing our automati-
zations, we see what we expect to see. 
Katz's portrait of mystical experience as constructed is not far from this one. 
Although sometimes Katz and his colleagues seem to imply that the experience 
is constructed ex nihilo from expectations,13 typically he makes the more modest 
assertion that concepts and beliefs "shape" and "color"-i.e., lend significant 
content or form to--the experience, much as Manet's expectations did to his 
vision. 14 
[Als a result of his process of intellectual acculturation in its broadest 
sense, the mystic brings to his experience a world of concepts, images, 
symbols, and values which shape as well as color the experience he 
eventually and actually has. (46) (Italics mine) 
Where a mystical experience differs from an ordinary perceptual experience like 
Manet's is that the schema which serves as a formulary for the perception is a 
new one adopted from the subject's religious or mystical tradition. 
Properly understood, yoga, for example, is not an unconditioning or 
deconditioning of consciousness, but rather it is a reconditioning of 
consciousness, i.e. a substituting of one form of conditioned and/or 
contextual consciousness for another, albeit a new, unusual, and perhaps 
altogether more interesting form of conditioned-contextual conscious-
ness. 15 
The mystic's epistemological process is thus essentially identical with the ordinary 
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ones-Dnly the mystic is substituting a new set of formula for the old. To extend 
the analogy, if Manet learned something new about Gothic arches and then 
mis-painted in those terms, he would be substituting one automatization for 
another, and would be having an experience whose epistemological structure 
paralleled the mystic's. 
This constructivist approach has several compelling merits. First, given the 
plausibility and widespread acceptance of this picture of most experiences as in 
part constructed, it is credible. With reference to mysticism, the account cannot 
but make stand in relief the distinctions between mystics found in different 
traditions. These are not inconsiderable virtues. 
However, despite these virtues, in addressing the mystical data itself the 
approach has four significant failings which I think militate strongly against its 
acceptance. The first concerns the pure consciousness (PC) event, in which one 
is awake but devoid of objects for attention. There is so much evidence for this 
state that Prigge and Kessler make it the sine qua non of mysticism. 16 Katz's 
thesis requires that there must be complex epistemological construction even 
here. Thus he is driven to claim that reports of PC be mistaken, that "there is 
no pure consciousness per se. "17 But as Bernhardt and Perovich both have argued, 
there just doesn't seem to be enough complexity in these quiet moments to 
warrant this claim. 
In fact it is hard to see how one could say that the pure consciousness 
event is mediated, if by that it is meant that during the event the mystic 
is employing concepts, differentiating his awareness according to 
religious patterns and symbols, drawing upon memory, apprehension, 
expectation, language or accumulation of prior experience, or dis-
criminating and integrating. It just does not seem that there is sufficient 
complexity during the pure consciousness event to say that any such 
elements are involved. 18 
Devoid of an object of attention it is hard to see what X is being constructed, 
as Katz put it. By drawing a parallel with developments in the philosophy of 
science, Perovich has argued in the Journal of Religion for a second failing, the 
theory's incompleteness, for from Katz we have no thoroughgoing account 
specifying which concepts are and are not involved in the formation of mystical 
experience. Hence we are left with no reason to think that a changed belief in 
even some half-forgotten fact would not lead inevitably to a change in experi-
ence. 19 A third failing has to do with Katz's textual strategy, which is overly 
monodimensional. When he writes that the only evidence one can call on is the 
recording of a mystic, and that this is already interpreted, this denies out of hand 
that something near to raw phenomenological reports are even possible. Further-
more, Katz et al. limit the data to textual sources exclusively, yet through 
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interviews with living mystics one may be able to ask questions which the mystic 
may not have asked himself-e.g., which interpretations do and do not predate 
and hence possibly playa role in an experience. 
However rather than pursuing these matters I would prefer to focus on a fourth 
shortcoming of the theory for this will lead to the alternative model I would like 
to put forward. At heart we have here an hypothesis about the cause or formation 
of mystical experiences. It is an inherently conservative one, that expectations 
and models "contribute heavily to the creation-I repeat to the creation of 
[mystical] experience,"2o and that as a result of holding particular expectations 
a mystic will have an experience which matches them. While it is true that most 
classical texts attest to the match between experience and expectations, those 
expectations may precede but not cause the experience (there may be a contingent 
but not a necessary connection between them"]. One way to determine the causal 
role of expectations is to look at cases in which they were contravened. These 
cases raise doubts about the hypothesis that expectations playa "heavy" formative 
role. 
There are two types of cases in which expectations are disconfirmed. First it 
is not unusual to hear of an untrained and uninitiated neophyte who has a mystical 
experience without any deep preconditioning. Paul's experience on the road to 
Damascus comes to mind, for this came upon him literally and figuratively out 
of the blue and transformed him 1800 • 22 More compelling perhaps are the cases 
of Richard Maurice Bucke, author of the early 20th century book Cosmic Con-
sciousness, and Bernadette Roberts, author of the recent The Experience of No 
Self, both of whom came to their mystical experiences without the requisite 
preconditioning. 23 I recently interviewed a 28-year old male whose first mystical 
experience, at 15, was utterly unanticipated. 24 In each case the subjects had 
undeniably mystical experiences and were led to religious texts, doctrines, and 
living exponents by their experiences; not the other way around. Religious and 
mystical understandings of their experiences did come, but only months and 
years after the experiences. What deeply assimilated and automatized "mystical" 
categories may have played the constructive role which "created" their respective 
ex periences? 
Perhaps it will be argued that a Bucke or a Roberts, simply by virtue of a life 
lived in the U.S., which is so deeply informed by the Judeo-Christian Wel-
tanschauung, acquired the appropriate mystical identificatory terms. 25 There is 
some plausibility to this-let us call it the prefigurement by osmosis argument-
though not, it will be granted, as much as has the theory on its home, conservative, 
turf. Or Paul, it may be argued, was unconsciously persuaded by his opposition's 
arguments, and that persuasion came out as Christ-audition. Again there is some 
plausibility to this, the reverse prefigurement argument. But at best the theory 
starts to sound ad hoc and lacking in the kind of elegance we expect from a 
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hypothesis. A conservative theory has difficulty accounting for creative novelty. 
A second type of divergence between expectation and experience occurs to 
the initiated and intellectually assimilated. When Teresa of A vila reports that 
until she underwent her experiences she "did not know what [she] was doing" 
she alludes to the irrelevance of her expectations. 26 On a neo-advaitan path I 
myself underwent an experience in which a series of bands or tubes running up 
the back of my neck and into my cranium became, one by one and from left to 
right, absolutely silent and transparent. I had never heard or read of such bands 
or tubes-and indeed have not yet. Similarly, before a 36-year old female prac-
titioner of the transcendental meditation program I interviewed gained a higher 
state of consciousness (my term, not hers) she experienced some finger-like 
sensations atop her head which opened-up like flower petalS. 27 In each of these 
cases, the key feature is novelty-not just any novelty, but one which seems to 
stand at the very nub of the alteration. In every case the mode of transformation 
was utterly unexpected, and surprising.28 Something besides expectations and 
beliefs seems to be playing the decisive formative role in such events. Furthermore 
it is rare that a mystic does not report surprise over his or her experiences. 29 
Before one imposes some formula onto experience, certainly one must have 
become acquainted with it. Though it is logically possible that one could be 
merely superficially so acquainted, for the hypothesis to ring true we would 
expect to see signs of a deep and thoroughgoing acquaintance with that formulary 
before constructing in its terms. Manet would not have been likely to mistake 
a round archway for a pointed one had he not a thoroughgoing acquaintance 
with things Gothic. Yet here we have cases in which there is not only no 
thoroughgoing acquaintance, but no acquaintance at all with the particularities 
of one's experiences. Does it not seem that Manet's visual automatisms and 
mystical transformations are not analogous-the data just doesn't fit into the 
framework-and that some causal factor besides automatizations is at work here? 
Let us look at the matter on its own terms, without imposing presuppositions 
derived from ordinary experience. 
II. Mysticism as a Result of "Forgetting" 
As a first step let us see what a few mystics say about what is going on in 
the production of their experiences. Eckhart, about whom I have recently com-
pleted a book, writes: 
... the more completely you are able to draw in your [intellectual and sen-
sory] powers to a unity andforget all those things and their [mental] images 
which you have absorbed ... the nearer you are to [this experiencepo 
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To achieve an interior act, a man must collect all his powers as if into 
a comer of his soul ... hiding away from all images and forms . 
Here, he must come to aforgetting and an unknowing. 3' 
The key technique by means of which Eckhart here (and elsewhere) instructs 
his listeners to bring about the experience he advocates is: a turning away from 
ideas and conceptual forms, a gelazen-Ietting them go: a retreat from thought; 
an "unknowing" in Pseudo-Dionysius's term; or, as Eckhart prefers to put it, a 
vergessen, forgetting. A similar notion of leaving thoughts behind is put forward 
by the Zen Roshi, Rosen Takashina, who speaks of being "without thoughts." 
We are to stop the workings of the thinking mind, he writes: 
[This] means to cut off at the root and source all our discriminating 
fancies . ... 'In Zen the important thing is to stop the course of the 
heart.' It means to stop the workings of our empirical consciousness, 
the mass of thoughts, ideas and perceptions. 32 
When Takashina and Eckhart say that we "must" cut off or forget thoughts, 
I understand them as giving some sort of instruction. What is the nature of this 
forgetting they are signalling? There are three basic meanings of "forget." I think 
they are not prescribing a forgetting in the first sense: to permanently lose the 
remembrance of-as in "I once knew it but I have forgotten the year's of Kant's 
birth." For in speaking at all, the mystics clear,ly can remember images, forms 
etc., and so they have not permanently lost memory. Nor do they intend a 
second, behavioral, meaning: to omit or disregard unintentionally, as in "I forgot 
to bring my keys." This is a countervolitional meaning, and these mystics are 
inviting the listener to forget something intentionally. I think that they mean 
something nearer to the third sense of forget: to disregard intentionally, to pur-
posely ignore, as in "Forget about the insult," or "Disregard what you heard 
about ghosts." One may understand and be capable of remembering something 
but for some reason one intentionally lays aside this knowledge or capacity. 
If someone said to Manet "forget what you know of Gothic arches and look 
over there," they would be using the term in this sense. Hearing this Manet 
would intentionally lay aside his "Gothic" blanks or formularies and look at the 
visual information before him. He would not forget "Gothic" in the permanent 
sense, for he could presumably recall the nature of a Gothic arch at will. Rather 
he would forget it in the sense of doing without his Gothic formula for the nonce. 
If he was good at this, for however long he forgot it, his Gothic arch formula 
would play no significant part in determining the characteristics of his painting, 
any more than did his equally forgotten memories of say ogee (onion-domed) 
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arches, or even more absurdly, the forgotten maiden name of his mother. 33 In 
other words, if! have understood the sense of "forget" intended by these mystics, 
then Katz has the Manet example backwards. The mystic's technique seems 
more akin to Manet's forgetting "Gothicness" than remembering and superim-
posing it. We may define the mystical use of forget as a more or less temporary 
holding of some conceptual formula in abeyance. 
But, you are perhaps thinking, not much is gained so far. It may be true that 
on being told to "forget Gothicness and look" Manet might come to cease applying 
his Gothic formulary; but certainly he would not do without all formula or 
constructions whatsoever. Probably he will simply replace one formula with 
another-say Romanesque-Dr if that doesn't suit, adapt and modify that one 
still further until the fit is pretty close. 34 Such a process of replacing one schema 
with another and altering it is perfectly in accord with the constructivist picture-
that we move from one conditioned and constructed form of consciousness to 
another. 
Here however is one of the places wherein my Manet analogy with mystical 
experience falls short. Rosen Takashina did not say substitute one form of 
discrimination for another but rather "cut off . . . all our discriminating fancies." 
Eckhart said that the more you can forget your ideas the nearer you will come 
to the experience he advocates-implying that the experience comes by dropping 
"ideas and forms" altogether. Manet would trade schemata, these men counsel 
some form of dropping them altogether. 
How might a mystic bring himself to forget on a massive scale? 
Non-mystical techniques which bring about a forgetting typically involve rep-
etition of a subroutine. One of the simplest was developed by a group of physiolog-
ical psychologists who mounted a tiny projector on a contact lens. This device 
caused a visual image to remain constant on the retina, despite movements of 
the eyeball. The effect on awareness of this constant stimulus was that the image 
tended to disappear: it was Jorgotten if you will. A similar effect is produced 
when an observer is placed in a so-called ganzJeld, a completely patternless 
visual field. A whitewashed surface or a blizzard can serve as a ganzfeld, as 
can two halves of a ping-pong ball taped over the eyes. Ganzfeld observers 
consistently reported what they called "blackout": 
not merely the experience of seeing nothing but that of not seeing, a 
complete disappearance of the sense of vision for short periods . . . 
During blackout the observers did not know, for instance, whether their 
eyes were open or not . . . continuous uniform stimulation resulted in 
the failure of any kind of image to be produced in consciousness. 35 
Rather than a shift from one image to another being constructed by the mind, 
these techniques bring about something like a complete forgetting of the sense 
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of vision. 
Turning to mystical techniques, Ornstein and Naranjo have suggested that the 
common meditative practices of restricting awareness to a single unchanging 
process may have a parallel structure as this constant visual stimulus. The object 
for attention may be in any sense mode: it may be verbal (mantras, dervish calls 
or short prayers), visual (like a yantra or a guru's picture), or the concentration 
may be held on a regular bodily process like the heartbeat or the breath. It does 
not seem to matter which actual physical practice is followed; what seems critical 
is the 
attempt to recycle the same subroutine over and over again in the 
nervous system .... The specific object of meditation (for this analysis) 
is much less important than maintaining the object as the single focus 
of awareness over a long period of time. 36 
The effect of such a recycling of a single subroutine parallels that of the ganzfeld 
or the constant visual image: not merely does the recycled stimulus itself ulti-
mately fade, but there is a complete disappearance of any sense of thinking, 
perceiving etc. All perception and mental activity are, in a word,forgotten. The 
vacuous state of emptiness so produced, it should be clear, is not like remembering 
something and shaping visual information in its terms; it is closer to a massive 
forgetting. 
There is a second type of commonly used mystical practice: Ornstein and 
Naranjo have called this the technique of "opening up." They introduce it in 
terms of the notion of automatized stereotyped formularies. In the technique of 
"opening up" the practitioner is taught to become aware of his/her automatized 
perceptual and cognitive habits and cease perceiving and behaving in their terms: 
The Sufi and other traditions contend that the selective and restricted 
nature of awareness is an obstacle to be overcome and that the process 
of meditation, among other exercises, is a way of turning down the 
restrictions that normally limit awareness. One specific aim in these 
traditions is the removal of the automaticity and selectivity of ordinary 
awareness. 37 
The aim of such techniques is to bring about a new perceptual mode which 
employs no such automatizations. It is an attempt to "deautomatize"-in Gill 
and Brenman's term--{)r undo an automatized apparatus. 38 To remove an 
automatism is to intentionally hold it in abeyance: to forget it. 
A third technique, usually found in conjunction with one or both of the others 
is renunciation. This technique serves to reinforce this forgetting process by 
reducing the "nutriment" of certain kinds of structures. When belongings, 
friendships and sexual partners as well as the desires for such-which had served 
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as the reinforcing stimuli of perceptual and cognitive structures-are reduced, 
their corresponding cognitive and psychic structures tend to be weakened and 
even disrupted, which again leads to their deautomatization. 39 Renunciations's 
effect is again not to replace one habit and set of structures with other equivalent 
ones but to forget such altogether. 
These techniques, if successful, result in two related but distinguishable forms 
of forgetting. The meditative process results in the pure consciousness event, in 
which every idea, percept and sensation is temporarily forgotten. This may be 
viewed as the result of a massive and total forgetting of all perceptual and 
cognitive activity. The second form of forgetting, that of deautomatization, can 
be permanent and experienced in activity. It is brought about, as I noted, by the 
"opening up" technique and by meditation. Meditation brings deautomatization 
about by systematically disallowing some or all ratiocinative processes. As is 
seen in sensory isolation experiments, such a temporary abstention from ordinary 
cognitive functions can be expected to decrease the reinforcement or psychic 
nutriment of their habits, and as a result those habits may come to lose their 
automatized status. Especially when used alongside an "opening up" technique, 
meditation will result in the deautomatization of many of one's cognitive proces-
ses, thoughts, perceptual habits, etc. 
The practice of meditation, then, can be considered as an attempt to 
turn off conceptual activity temporarily, to shut off all input processing 
for a period of time, to get away for a while from the external environ-
ment. 
A result of this "turning off' of our input selection systems is that, 
when we introduce the same sensory input later, we see it differently, 
"anew" [i.e. without the mediation of the old automatized habits]."" 
Some of those old behavioral and perceptual habits will be simply forgotten in 
the sense that one will cease to employ them altogether. In other cases one will 
come to forget in the subtler sense of employing constructions while remaining 
aware that they are but constructions. This will be a seeing in terms of one's 
formularies, yet holding them simultaneously in abeyance. 41 Were Manet to paint 
the arch as Gothic and simultaneously to see that this was inaccurate, he would 
have de automatized his perceptual category (forgotten it as an automatic one) 
and yet have continued to use it voluntarily. Katz's plea for the recognition of 
differences will apply here for despite remaining conscious of their nature as 
conventional, to the extent that one thinks in their terms the concepts one uses 
will remain context dependent. 
I should point out that what is forgotten altogether in the pure consciousness 
event and what is deautonatized in activity is expressly stated to include the very 
teachings of the mystical traditions itself. When Eckhart talks for example about 
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gelazen, letting go, he expressly includes all notions of God-and his own belief 
system-as part of that which must be given Up.42 When the Zen aphorism says, 
"If you see Buddha on the road, kill him," it is stating a similar requirement: 
all beliefs and emotional attachments to one's own Buddhist interpretive 
categories must be "kilIed"-that is intentionally forgotten-before the final goal 
can be achieved.43 
I am making no argument for universality here. It is not clear to me that all 
traditions harness the forgetting technique, or that all techniques are equally 
effective. This can only be determined case by case. Rather the claim is more 
modest: when a tradition uses techniques which effect a forgetting, then automati-
zation and concepts may not play the "heavy" formative role Katz gives them. 
In general a forgotten concept-be it Manet's concept of Gothic or his mother's 
maiden name-plays no role in an experience. If something is truly forgotten it 
does not form or cause or mediate or construct an experience. If in objectless 
consciousness all concepts are indeed forgotten, then they will play no construc-
tive role during the event. 
But this model--especially as it applies to the pure consciousness event--does 
have an interesting result for the pluralism question, that of the similarity of 
experience between two traditions which do harness the forgetting technique. If 
Manet forgot Gothicness and Picasso forgot Gothicness, we would still expect 
them to paint the archways differently, for there are so many other formularies 
and constructs involved in perception that they would still not see alike. However 
the story changes if two or more people were able to forget everything for awhile. 
Strange to say, but a ganzJeld would produce an indistinguishable visual experi-
ence for Picasso or Manet. Both are without content, image formation, etc. 
Similarly if a Buddhist, Hindu or African forgot every thought, sensation, emo-
tion, etc., then no historically conditioned idea, form, category or even sensory 
information would remain conscious to differentiate the resultant events from 
one to another. 44 A formless trance in Buddhism may be experientially indistin-
guishable from one in Hinduism or Christianity. This model swings the pendulum 
back towards the perennial philosophy camp, that mysticism is alike from one 
culture to another. 
I think in the last analysis the choice comes down to one of informing models. 
Shall we employ a model which was developed to account for ordinary perceptual, 
conceptual and affective experience-and does so remarkably well all in all? Or 
shall we employ an explanatory model for these atypical experiences which 
grows organically out of the instructions for and nature of this experience? That 
the "forgetting" model takes the actual techniques used to bring about mystical 
experiences with utmost seriousness is one of its greatest strengths. When a 
Meister Eckhart says, "if only you could suddenly be unaware of all things ... " 
and have neither memory, nor understanding, nor senses function, this paradigm 
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does not have to say that he is making a mistake. Rather it says that he is telling 
us exactly how the mind must come to function in order to have the mystical 
experience: that is, unaware of all things, having forgotten all of one's habitual 
cogniti ve structures. 
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